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A TRIBUTE TO THE
HONORABLE IRVING R. KAUFMAN
T HE Fordham Law Review is proud to present "The Anatomy of
Decisionmaking," by one of Fordham's most distinguished alumni,
Judge Irving R. Kaufman. We are also pleased to take this opportunity
to congratulate Judge Kaufman on his thirty-five years of active service
on the federal bench. In his article, the Judge writes that "abstract prin-
ciples of judging must be grounded in life's experiences and augmented
by an understanding of the day-to-day realities of the judicial process."
Judge Kaufman's great experience gives him a unique and valuable un-
derstanding of the role of the judiciary.
Appointed at age thirty-nine to the District Court by President Tru-
man, Judge Kaufman spent twelve years as a trial judge. When a va-
cancy on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals arose in 1961, the Judge's
mentor and friend, Judge Learned Hand, wrote to President Kennedy:
Judge Kaufman "is a man of most exceptional capacity. He has an admi-
rable mind,. . . is most anxious to discharge his duties without prejudice
or favor, and is extraordinarily diligent." Judge Hand's recommendation
has been more than borne out during Judge Kaufman's twenty-three
years on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, seven of which he served
as Chief Judge. In addition to producing his many thoughtful opinions,
Judge Kaufman as Chief Judge instituted bold new programs to ease the
ever-growing caseload in the Second Circuit, reforms that have since
been adopted throughout the federal system. These innovative changes
prompted Justice Marshall to write, "[No one] can point to any forward
movement in judicial administration . . . in the last twenty-five years
that [Judge Kaufman] wasn't either the leader of or had a hand in."
Judge Kaufman also has an outstanding record of involvement in ex-
trajudicial activities. His contributions include service as Chairman of
the Committees on the Judicial Branch and on the Operation of the Jury
System of the Judicial Conference of the United States, President of the
Institute of Judicial Administration, Chairman of the ABA-IJA Juvenile
Justice Standards Project, and director of a number of community orga-
nizations. Currently, he is serving as Chairman of the President's Com-
mission on Organized Crime.
Finally, Judge Kaufman has contributed enormously to the body of
legal scholarship on which students, members of the bar and judges rely.
His bibliography-which comprises some three hundred articles-covers
a broad expanse of topics: free expression, juvenile justice, criminal law,
business and regulatory law, international law, practice and procedure,
judicial reform and administration, and legal ethics, to name a few.
Rather than limiting his publications to law reviews and scholarly jour-
nals, the Judge has endeavored to educate the public about the law and
the judicial process. His frequent contributions to the New York Times
vi FORDHAM, LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53
and other general interest publications have gone far in achieving this
goal.
These commitments to judicial excellence, extrajudicial involvement
and scholarship have marked Judge Kaufman's productive and success-
ful career. Moreover, they serve to make his discussion of judicial deci-
sionmaking particularly valuable. We applaud Judge Irving R. Kaufman
on his thirty-five years of distinguished service on the bench, and look
forward to many more.
The Board of Editors
THE ANATOMY OF DECISIONMAKING
IRVING R. KA UFMAN*
INTRODUCTION
JUDICIAL decisionmaking is a process that is generally associated
with theoretical concepts. The practical considerations that guide ap-
pellate judges, however, are equally important and all too often ignored.
The process of adjudication is a delicately calibrated mixture of theory
and practice, of art and science. Academic appraisals and criticisms have
often proved valuable in rethinking this society's approach to justice and
the role of its courts. Nevertheless, such commentary may create the im-
pression that dispassionate analysis is the sole determinant in judicial
decisionmaking, irrespective of the facts of the particular case.
After thirty-five years of service on the federal bench, I have found
that abstract concepts of judging must be grounded in the realities of the
judicial process. This selective reminiscence is an attempt to articulate
many of the principles that have guided one judge over the years.
I am not the first judge to have thought and rethought the conun-
drums of decisionmaking, the untangling of the meaning of a statute or a
case, the degree to which a constitutional question requires or forbids a
particular judicial response. Yet these familiar themes, like great melo-
dies, are worth repeating. Not only does each judge bring his or her own
interpretation to the work, to the emphasis given each note, but the re-
playing of these familiar chords recalls the importance of the individual
pieces that together create and remake that great human composition
known as the law.
There are, as Cardozo reminded us, many ingredients in the "brew"
that makes up a judicial decision; and a discussion of any one element of
that "strange compound"' is, of necessity, tainted by an artificial separa-
tion of parts. Yet sever we must, because language precludes our stating
more than one idea at a time.
In speaking first of facts, then of law, and finally of the influence of the
judge's individual character, I intend no indirect statement of philosophi-
cal ordering. It is the relationship among the parts, unconscious though
it may be, that is of the essence of the work of judging. To begin, how-
ever, I present a brief exposition of the importance of facts at the appel-
late level.
I. FACTS: THE BEDROCK OF DECISIONMAKING
By the time facts reach a court of appeals, they have fallen into disre-
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; B.A. 1928, Ford-
ham University; J.D. 1931, Fordham University School of Law.
1. B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 10 (1949).
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pute, and their low status is due in large part to their having been
"found." "I hate facts," Holmes once wrote, 2 and that animosity may
have arisen from his awareness that facts generally lack the malleability
that would permit a supple intellect to mold a principle or rule into a
better one. Facts are also frustrating because, although fixed in time,
they can nonetheless be elusive to establish. Jerome Frank, who was per-
haps more concerned than any other judge with the troublesome nature
of fact-finding at the trial level, titled one of his essays, "Facts are
Guesses," 3 leaving all of us who must work with these defective materials
less certain as we ponder them.
I agree with Karl Llewellyn that "facts are hardy weeds. They will not
down. Whatever the theory, courts of review of 'pure law' feel the pres-
sure of the individual case, and strain to decide it right."' One of the
most common mistakes made by attorneys is to succumb to the tempta-
tion to overgeneralize. A judge cannot and must not resolve cases by
reference to abstract tenets alone.5 Indeed, to learn to resist the seduction
of pure logic-to challenge pristine ideas with the mundane materials of
everyday life-may be among the most important lessons for those em-
barking on careers in law.6 The elusive distinction between the general
and particular, the intangible and concrete, must be discovered and redis-
covered with a scrupulous care that places a high priority on the impor-
tance of the case to the individual litigant.7 In the end, law is among the
most human of all enterprises, and those who are appointed to decide
questions of "law" must contend with all the drama, confusion, failure
and achievement that constitute the human experience.
Facts assert their importance in a variety of ways at the appellate level.
When they arrive in droves there is no avoiding them, regardless of how
much we might wish to see a briefer appendix or limit our consideration
2. 2 Holmes-Pollock Letters 13 (M. Howe ed. 1941). That the Justice's remark was
less than completely serious is evidenced by the line immediately following it: "I always
say the chief end of man is to form general propositions - adding that no general propo-
sition is worth a damn." Id.
3. See J. Frank, Courts On Trial 14 (1949); see also L.D. Brandeis, Statement Before
Federal Trade Commission (April 30, 1915) (major difficulty is getting at the facts),
quoted in The Brandeis Guide to the Modem World 121 (A. Lief ed. 1941).
4. K. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 36 (1960).
5. See infra notes 107-113 and accompanying text for an illustration of why a judge
must look beyond abstract legal tenets when deciding a case.
6. I have argued on another occasion that the American model of legal education is
flawed, in that it steeps law students in doctrine but fails to stress practical training in
litigation techniques. See Kaufman, Attorney Incompetence: A Plea for Reform, 69
A.B.A. J. 308, 311 (1983). Some slight rays of hope in this regard are beginning to
emerge as clinical education of aspiring litigators is becoming more widespread. Never-
theless, far too few recent law graduates evidence an understanding of the fact that
"[a]dvocacy is the art of persuaion, not merely memorization or logical deduction." Id.
7. I have written that "[flor the private citizen engaged in litigation, the outcome of
his lawsuit may profoundly influence the future course of his life whether the issues
presented raise questions of constitutional stature and great moment to the Republic, or
merely rules of law that allow of limited application and arouse slight jurisprudential
interest." Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Robitaille, 495 F.2d 890, 891 (2d Cir. 1974).
[Vol. 53
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to principles alone. I shall never forget the sheer volume of information
that had to be assimilated before resolving the legal questions in Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,8 a complex antitrust case. Moreover,
certain standards-constitutional or statutory-require a court to cast a
particularly bright light on the details of a case as we approach a deci-
sion. The intricacies of fourth amendment adjudication, for example,
press us to pay even more than our usual attention to the precise factual
context.9 Similarly, troubling questions concerning attorney ethics de-
mand particularly painstaking analyses of the facts. 0
8. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cerL denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). Berkey stands as
an exemplar of the critical importance of facts in deciding cases.
Berkey Photo, Inc.-something of a David to Kodak's Goliath-brought suit alleging
that Kodak had monopolized a number of separate markets within the meaning of sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C § 2 (1982). See id. at 267. The purpose and proper
construction of section 2 have been subjects of furious debate since the Act was passed in
1890. See R. Bork, Antitrust Paradox 17 (1978) (describing competing policies). Some
have argued that size is an evil in itself, and that the enduring success of American capi-
talism is the result of competition among many small firms in a given industry. Cf. Chi-
cago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918) (among purposes of
antitrust law is protection of small competitors). Others have maintained that the anti-
trust laws are meant to protect competition rather than individual competitors. See gener-
ally K. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 3-22 (1976) (economic theory
provides the only suitable basis for antitrust policy). Thus, as a first step, we were re-
quired to decide a doctrinal question: What was the Sherman Act meant to protect
against? Writing for the court, I stated that it was abuse of market power. See Berkey,
603 F.2d at 274-75. Kodak, enormous as it was (and is), had grown because of good
management, not unfair or predatory practices. To penalize Kodak for its good businessjudgment exercised over the years struck me as particularly unfair-and unwise.
Learned Hand wrote: "The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must
not be turned upon when he wins." United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d
416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
But such a choice was merely the beginning of the inquiry. To determine whether
Kodak had misused its power in various markets required a painstaking analysis of the
minutiae of the photographic industry: sales figures of the various firms; an examination
of the effects of international competitors in the domestic market; products on the cutting
edge of the new photographic technologies; and so on. See Berkey, 603 F.2d at 268-71.
Unlike commentators who announce doctrinal positions, judges must go one step further.
We must understand the particular facts of each case in sufficient detail to ensure that our
legal views-and occasionally our philosophical leaning-are applied correctly. See infra
notes 61-80 and accompanying text. Of necessity, the voluminous factual record in Ber-
key determined the outcome of the case.
9. An illustration is seen in the case of United States ex rel Mahoney v. LaVallee,
396 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1968), cert denied, 395 U.S. 985 (1969). We were asked to decide
whether a search was incidental to a lawful arrest. Guided only by vague standards such
as substantial contemporaneity and reasonableness, the precise circumstances of the
search became all-important. Id. at 889. In the end, we held that the search had been
conducted lawfully. Id. at 889-90. My point here is that the outcome had more to do
with the exact interval between the time of arrest and the commencement of the search-
a mere ten minutes-than with any profound notions of fairness under the fourth amend-
ment. As I wrote then, "reasoning in the air in disregard of the circumstances of the
particular case is an untrustworthy guide to decision." Id. at 889.
10. Almost thirty years ago, as a District Judge, I wrote:
When dealing with ethical principles,. . . we cannot paint with broad strokes.
The lines are fine and must be so marked. Guide-posts can be established when
virgin ground is being explored, and the conclusion in a particular case can be
1984]
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The different backdrops against which facts appear dictate the con-
tours of our powers to review the findings of the trial judge." We are
bound by the trial judge's determinations regarding the credibility of wit-
nesses.12 Uncontested documentary evidence, however, may allow us to
draw our own inferences despite our absence from the courtroom. 13 New
technologies have also enabled appellate judges to divine meanings once
reserved to the senses of the trial judge. 4
One procedural device of immense importance, summary judgment, 15
has required courts of appeals to grapple with the ultimate conundrum:
the elusive line between fact and law.16 After all, to declare the existence
or nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact, one must know not
only what is genuine and material, but what is "fact." Because of the
reached only after painstaking analysis of the facts and precise application of
precedent.
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); see also Fund
of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 226-27 (2d Cir. 1977) (applying
those principles to issue of disqualification of counsel).
11. At the outset, it is important to recognize that appellate courts serve two func-
tions. In the first, the court finds and reverses errors made below. Perhaps just as impor-
tant, however, is its role in affirming decisions made at trial. In so affirming, a panel of
appellate judges leaves the imprimatur of a higher court on the trial judge's disposition.
In a society governed by the rule of law, the value of such consensus cannot be over-
stated. Once affirmed, a decision may no longer be viewed as the product of one judge's
personal predilections. Insofar as appellate panels reflect the pluralistic ethos of the com-
munity, an affirmance represents a far broader statement than that emanating from a trial
judge sitting in isolation. Thus a judge's decision, once affirmed, becomes, to a far greater
degree, society's decision.
For these reasons, a trial judge does not look with trepidation upon appellate review of
his findings. On the contrary, particularly in a controversial case, he welcomes the op-
portunity to have his individual decision elevated to the status of legal consensus.
12. Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part that
"[flindings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); see United States v. Birnbaum, 373 F.2d 250, 257 (2d Cir.) ("rele-
vant inquiry for an appellate court. . . is not whether the trial was free from errors, but
rather whether it was free from prejudicial errors") (emphasis in original), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 837 (1967); United States v. Robbins, 340 F.2d 684, 687 (2d Cir. 1965) (where
"evidence [is] sufficient to warrant submission to the jury, .. appellate judges [should
not] weigh evidence or judge credibility").
13. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 308 F.2d 911, 915 (2d Cir. 1962)
(court considered uncontested documentary evidence of severe snowfall); State of Wash-
ington v. United States, 214 F.2d 33, 41 (9th Cir. 1954) (court considered evidence of
undisputed physical facts in record).
14. In United States v. Huss, 482 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1973), we were asked to decide
whether a criminal defendant in a bombing case had "just cause" to withhold testimony.
Id. at 44. The defendant's guilt or innocence turned on our deciphering the meaning of a
tape recorded phrase. Id. at 41, 49-50. The state claimed that the phrase was, "You know
it's done on wiretaps"; the defendant argued that the phrase was, "You know it's not on
wiretaps." Id. at 49-50 (emphasis in original). We concluded the phrase was the former.
Id. at 50.
15. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ("The judgment shall be rendered forthwith if. . . there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law.").
16. See Empire Electronics Co. v. United States, 311 F.2d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 1962).
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difficulties inherent in this device, I have long felt that it is the responsi-
bility of the appellate courts to assist trial judges and attorneys by period-
ically rearticulating and illustrating the law of summary judgments.
Such pronouncements help trial judges to recognize the point at which
factual exploration-whether in discovery or in full-blown litigation-is
sufficiently complete to move from the realm of gathering fact to that of
applying law. 7
The "case or controversy" mandate under which all article III judges
operate"8 is not only a reminder of the respective functions of the differ-
ent branches of government, 9 but is also a precise means of ensuring that
facts retain their central and paradoxical role in decisionmaking. This
constitutional directive ensures that the law can change, yet it prevents
change at a pace or in a manner that ignores the dilemmas of a society at
a given time. Facts prevent wooden or mechanical reliance on legal prin-
ciples, for "[a]lthough deliberative examination of. . . precedents is
helpful, we can hardly expect to be provided with all-purpose, ever-appli-
cable standards ... ."Io Each case forces some modicum of invention,
yet these same facts serve to contain an otherwise overbroad discretion
by limiting the degree to which a judge can extend an innovative holding
beyond its origins.
The most important function of these poor cousins of lofty abstrac-
tions may be their usefulness in prodding otherwise reluctant judges into
the lap of justice. A statute whose flat prose at first yields only a dry and
one-dimensional meaning may receive deeper thought when the human
story to which it has become attached elicits some feeling in the judge.
The process to which I refer, however, brings me a step ahead of my
intended subject at this point. I shall return to the complex alchemy of
judicial character and case. I turn now, however, to my second broad
category: the interpretation of constitutions, statutes and precedents-
what we commonly term "law."
II. PLUMBING THE MEANING OF THE WRITTEN WORD
Federal judges quickly become adept at deciding questions concerning
virtually every variety of law.2' The diversity jurisdiction suits that un-
17. See Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1983); SEC v. Re-
search Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 32 (2d Cir. 1978); Heyman v. Commerce & In-
dus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1319-20 (2d Cir. 1975).
18. The Constitution provides that: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United States
.... " U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. I.
19. Mr. Justice Day explained the role of the "case or controversy" requirement in
apportioning power among the branches as follows: "[T]he right to declare an act of
Congress unconstitutional [can] only be exercised when a proper case between opposing
parties [is] submitted for judicial determination; ... there [is] no general veto power in
the court upon the legislation of Congress ...." Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S.
346, 357 (1911).
20. United States v. Winfield, 341 F.2d 70, 71 (2d Cir. 1965).
21. Among other things, we are responsible for what Judge Henry Friendly once de-
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happily inundate our dockets require us to remain familiar with and give
deference to state law precedents in both traditional common law areas
such as contracts and torts, as well as the construction of state statutes.
At the same time, we must be versed in the interpretation of federal stat-
utes, including those that by their terms incorporate entire doctrines
from common law.22 Finally, we deal with the awesome task of deciding
constitutional questions.
A. Statutory Interpretation: Divining the Legislative Will
I turn first to one particularly fascinating species of our work: the crea-
tion of what is known as the judicial gloss on a statute. Legislation, as
many scholars have remarked, is inherently incapable of encompassing
the infinitely varied concrete facts of human existence,2" or predicting the
needs of circumstances that have not yet occurred.24 As a result, collec-
tive political bodies that create law must, of necessity, accept that there
will be some judicial additions to or modifications of the work they have
produced. These judge-made creations, rooted in the bedrock of legisla-
tion, are hybrids coupling language and intent with unforeseen or unac-
knowledged realities. The political stock thus may bear unexpected
dividends.
How does this odd evolution take place? Or, to be more precise, how
should a judge construe a statute and how does he or she in fact do so?
Although the temptation to take refuge in generalities is great, I will in-
stead respond to these questions by reference to an actual case that came
before my court. I will set forth the facts, the legal issue and the juris-
prudential alternatives before revealing the resolution of the matter.
scribed as our post-Erie "specialized common law." H. Friendly, Benchmarks 180-81
(1967).
22. The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982), for example, incorporates one
of the most confounding common law principles ever to be codified into federal law-the
"fair use" doctrine. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195,
206 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984).
23. See B. Cardozo, supra note 1, at 15; J. Frank, supra note 3, at 293. The Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9602 (1982), aptly illustrates the complexity at-
tendant to efforts to legislate all aspects of human existence in a particular area. Its sheer
complexity and volume place its comprehension beyond the pale of all but the most
skilled tax lawyer. Moreover, in attempting to legislate comprehensively, Congress has
been hoisted on its own petard: as the Code's letter has expanded infinitely, its spirit has
been subjugated.
24. J. Frank, supra note 3, at 293. As the pace of technological innovation quickens,
the number of controversies that the legislature could not have foreseen greatly increases.
In 1976, when Congress passed the new Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982), it
clearly understood that the legislative scheme would be looked to in solving many types
of novel questions. Yet, barely half a decade later, the Supreme Court was left with little
guidance in deciding whether home taping of television programs for personal use was
infringing activity within the meaning of the Act. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, 104 S. Ct. 774, 782-83 (1984). Very simply, Congress did not (and probably
could not) foresee the evolution in technology that generated the explosive growth of
home taping. Once again, the legislative chinks were left to be filled with judicial mortar.
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Rosenberg v. Richardson25 concerned the Social Security Act's provi-
sions for widow's benefits. A gentleman had been married twice, once
from 1920 to 1933, and for a second time from 1935 until his death in
1971.26 The latter marriage took place in Connecticut to ensure that no
problems would be created by the Mexican divorce secured from his first
wife.27 Although the foreign decree was not recognized under the Social
Security Act, this fact alone would not have disqualified the second wife
from receiving benefits from her deceased husband's account, for Con-
gress had anticipated the possibility that marriages contracted in good
faith might be invalidated by state law technicalities. 28 The statute there-
fore created the category of "deemed widow," and the second wife was,
without question, able to receive benefits in that status.2 9
No controversy would have arisen if the first wife had not appeared in
December of 1971 to lay claim to the decedent's social security account.
An administative law judge, confronted with two claimants, looked to
the statutory language for assistance. The pertinent section provided:
The entitlement to a monthly benefit ... of a person who would not
be deemed to be a. . . widow. . . but for [the special provisions cre-
ating the "deemed widow" classification for persons like the second
wife]. . . shall end with the month. . . that another person is entitled
to a benefit under section 402(e) . . . if such other person is. . . the
• . . widow.
30
The administrative law judge held that deference to the literal meaning of
the statute required him to disqualify the second wife and declare the
first wife, (as the "legal widow") the rightful recipient. 3 Wife number
one, however, had a social security account of her own, and thus was
able to receive only $1.40 per month from the decedent's account. 2
Under the judge's ruling, the government retained the difference between
$1.40 and the total monthly payments, and wife number two, cast out by
literalism, was left to survive as she might.3 3 The district judge agreed,'
and this woman's plight found its way to the Second Circuit."
The legal dilemma in this case, then, concerned the proper construc-
tion of the statutory provision just quoted. What does it mean to speak
of a court construing a statute? One of my esteemed colleagues has re-
25. 538 F•2d 487 (2d Cir. 1976).
26. Id. at 488-89.
27. Id. at 489.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(B) (1982).
31. Rosenberg, 538 F.2d at 490.
32. Id. Under the Act, amounts received by a widow must be reduced "dollar-for-
dollar" by the widow's own old age benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 402(k)(3)(A) (1982). In Rosen-
berg, wife number one "was already receiving $168.30 per month on her own work ac-
count." Rosenberg, 538 F.2d at 490.
33. See Rosenberg, 538 F.2d at 490.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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phrased the dilemma aptly: The interpretation of statutes is "a Faustian
conflict between adherence to the words and search for the will-a
search moreover, that often is not for the will that was but the will that
would have been."' 36 In this case, the literal language of the statute may
have pointed to the narrow interpretation adopted by the administrative
law judge: Wife number two lost her right to the money and that was
that.
We are often told that judges are not to evaluate a law's wisdom, even
where the statute leads to a seeming injustice. 7 Here, however, we had
facts different from those envisaged by overworked legislative drafters.
The statutory language evinced a legislative intent to ensure rapid resolu-
tion of a conflict between claimants, one a "legal" and one a "deemed"
widow, both of whom demanded the entire disputed account.38 Whether
Congress meant those words to apply to a case in which a sizeable bal-
ance remained once the "legal" wife had taken her rightful share was
unclear. 39 The administrative law judge either had not thought of this
question or had not been sufficiently troubled by it to inquire into the
legislative intent underlying the statutory scheme. I, however, believe
that a court cannot rest without considering the statutory scheme and its
underlying aim. The "lodestar must be the statute's fundamental
purpose."'
I do not pretend that gleaning congressional intent from the often bar-
ren language of the United States Code is an easy task. For one thing, it
is not always clear whose "purpose" we ought to be discerning,41 because
a statute is the creation of many minds. Worse still is the fact
that the difficulties of so-called interpretation arise when the Legisla-
ture has no meaning at all; when the question which is raised on the
statute never occurred to it; when what the judges have to do is, not to
determine what the Legislature did mean on a point which was present
to its mind, but to guess what it would have intended on a point not
present to its mind, if the point had been present. 42
36. H. Friendly, supra note 21, at 199.
37. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
38. Rosenberg, 538 F.2d at 489, 491.
39. See id. at 491.
40. Silver v. Mohasco Corp., 602 F.2d 1083, 1087 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 447 U.S. 807 (1980); see also GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 716 (2d Cir.
1971) (failure to consider legislative history "would close off the only light available to
illumine the statute"), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); cf. United States v. Marion, 535
F.2d 697, 706 (2d Cir. 1976) (where clear meaning of statute and expressed intent coin-
cide, judiciary "must decline to redraft the legislative enactment"); Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee
Aeree Italiane, 370 F.2d 508, 511-12 (2d Cir. 1966) (language of Warsaw Convention
should be viewed not in isolation but in light of other articles and overall purpose), ajf'd
per curiam, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
41. See J. Frank, supra note 3, at 305.
42. J.Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law 173 (2d ed. 1921); see also FHA v.
Darlington Inc., 358 U. S. 84, 92 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The task is imagi-
natively to extrapolate the contemporaneous answer that the Legislature would have
given to an unconsidered question .... ").
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In Rosenberg v. Richardson,43 the threshold issue was whether this pe-
culiar nondistribution of benefits earned by the husband was foreseen by
the legislators, thereby mandating the administrative law judge's literal
interpretation.' An examination of legislative history revealed no defini-
tive answers-or even clues-regarding Congress' will in these circum-
stances.45 The draftsmen's failure to address a specific contingency does
not prove that it was never considered. Nonetheless, a court may con-
clude that it was as likely as not that the fates of two such wives had not
been contemplated. In short, there was nothing to indicate that a solu-
tion reached by reference to a statute's "fundamental purpose" rather
than its literal terms would defeat congressional foresight. Moreover, the
legislative hi~tory suggested that "a benefit" received by the first wife and
displacing the second should be understood as a "full benefit."'" Hence,
it could reasonably be deduced that Congress would prefer to distribute
the proceeds of the account rather than provide the government with a
windfall at the second wife's expense. I therefore concluded, as did my
colleagues on the panel, that the second wife should receive whatever
monies remained after the first wife-the "legal" wife-had taken her
one dollar and forty cents.47
In following this approach, I confess that we made law. But "judicial
lawmaking," often used in the pejorative, need not be confined to the
announcement of an entirely new rule. It also encompasses the clarifica-
tion of a rule that, for whatever reason, had not been made manifest by
the statutory language. I hope and believe that the solution in this case,
while doing no damage to the democratic process, served as well to do
what we commonly call justice.48
Divining the complex interplay of language and intent is only one of
the challenges judges face in construing statutes. Ambiguity, often the
result of the inability of lawmakers to reach a consensus, also requires
43. 538 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1976).
44. See id. at 491.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 490-91.
48. Justice is an intrinsically ineluctable term, as its evolution confirms. It has been
shaped by religious, philisophical, historical and legal thought. The ancient prophets
deemed "justice" as having two principal elements: conformity to Divine Will and a spe-
cial concern for those in need. See Kelsen, The Transcendental Character of Divine Jus-
tice, 22 Revista Juridica de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 1 (1952), reprinted in H.
Kelsen, What is Justice? Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science 25-81 (1957).
To Aristotle, "justice" represented equality before the law. H. Kelsen, What is Justice?
Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science 130-33 (1957). Plato spoke of "justice"
as a form of "dueness." H. Kelsen, Platonic Justice, in What is Justice? Justice, Law and
Politics in the Mirror of Science 99-102 (1957).
My conception of justice in this setting is guided by the consistent application of statu-
tory language and intent where ascertainable. But in the absence of such palpable gui-
dance, justice must by necessity derive its lifeblood from norms of higher moral
obligation and by discriminating individualization where general precepts of equity are
applied to concrete social situations.
1984]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53
that we assume an active role in determining the meaning of statutes.
The labyrinthine complexity of some legislation is such that courts must
untangle the innumerable competing strands of thought.49 In each of
these situations, a judge must discover the proper limits of judicial expli-
cation and, where necessary, judicial lawmaking. Cardozo saw the task
of interpreting statutes as one of the skills that must be mastered by any
judge.
[The judge] fills the open spaces in the law. How far he may go with-
out traveling beyond the walls of the interstices cannot be staked out
for him upon a chart. He must learn it for himself as he gains the
sense of fitness and 9proportion that comes with years of habitude in the
practice of an art.'u
The decision in Rosenberg v. Richardson "' turned more on legislative
purpose than legal precedent. Indeed, the play of precedent and factual
setting operates differently in the context of statutory construction than
on the broader stage of the common law. Statutes oblige us to place
ourselves in the shoes of the legislature: to know the legislature is to
know the law.2
B. Adherence to Precedent
Although precedents also force a judge to enter another mind, opin-
ions permit us greater leeway in determining what was and what will be
in the law.53How, then, should we view a precedent that may, or may
not, bear on a case under consideration? At the outset, we must view
that creature known as the holding with a mixture of reverence and wari-
ness. A judge is bound to follow case law; yet he must be prepared to
distinguish or deviate from it, for each new factual variation demands a
49. As I have noted elsewhere, the complexity of some statutes is "certain to acceler-
ate the aging process of judges." Lok v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 548 F.2d
37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977).
50. B. Cardozo, supra note 1, at 113-14. Given the inherently amorphous character
of statutory "walls," judges enjoy a potentially vast but generally untapped reservoir of
decisional latitude. Calibrating the precise "play in the joints" of a statute that has pur-
posefully been constructed broadly is among the most difficult of all the tasks with which
we are faced. In large part, judicial activism is spawned by breaking free from the nebu-
lous semantic bounds of restraint and conceiving judicial logic relative to the social conse-
quences of a chosen statutory interpretation, rather than a literal interpertation. Cf. J.
Dewey, Experience and Nature 17-27 (1929) (acknowledging subjective element in all
human experience).
51. 538 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1976).
52. Judge Frank likened the judge to a performer, the lawmaker to the composer, and
declared that the judge must try to "'reconcile the impulses of his (own) imagination
with the principle,' and he must 'obey the prescription. . . as well as he can.'" J. Frank,
supra note 3, at 301 (quoting E. Krenek, a modem composer).
53. See United States v. Drummond, 354 F.2d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 1965) ("The genius
of the common law lies in the process of reasoned elaboration from past precedent; unless
we explain our decisions of today with all the precision and exactitude at our command,
today's holdings will become but simple fiat and will provide no guidelines for to-
morrow's problems."), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1013 (1966).
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dynamic examination of the static precedent. This tension is but a re-
statement of Cardozo's paradox: "Law never is, but is always about to
be. It is realized only when embodied in a judgment, and in being real-
ized, expires."54
A legal decision, then, is not one but many choices coming together at
last in one case; a solution of awesome complexity, good for a moment
but honored as the embodiment of lasting law. 5 Cardozo also wrote:
"Cases do not unfold their principles for the asking. They yield up their
kernel slowly and painfully." 56 His thought would have been more pre-
cise if "kernel" were in the plural. Indeed, determining the expanse of a
particular decision requires a sophisticated understanding of the con-
tours and contexts in which the legal point arose.
I do not intend to suggest that case precedents and statutes are never
clear. Indeed, stare decisis and adherence to the unequivocal statutory
mandate are the bedrock of our legal system, as they must be, for reasons
of both principle and efficiency.57 As Cardozo stated: "[T]he labor of
judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past deci-
sion could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own
course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others
who had gone before him."5" In reality, the majority of holdings are not
obfuscated by tempting dicta, confused facts or an offhand attitude to-
54. B. Cardozo, supra note 1, at 126 (emphasis in original).
55. See id. at 29.
56. Id.
57. The unequivocal statutory mandate imposes an absolute restraint on a judge, but
we must adhere to it if there is to be a structure in the law. Thus, in enforcing the clearly
expressed will of Congress, a judge must remain cognizant of his duty to subordinate his
personal views to those of the representative body.
It is the rare statute, however, that by its express terms delimits the judiciary's inter-
pretative role. I believe that more often than not, the legislative branch expects and in-
vites courts to participate actively in the evolution of statutory guidelines.
58. B. Cardozo, supra note 1, at 149. It must be remembered that these words were
written in 1921. Cardozo's prescience was remarkable given that the import of his words
is far more telling today than it was 63 years ago. At that time, the spectre of a judiciary
staggering under the weight of a seemingly infinite case load comprised of complex ac-
tions had not yet become apparent. Although the qualitative uncertainties attendant to
judicial decisionmaking did exist, the quantitative dimension did not.
Today the situation is radically different. The number of cases filed in federal courts
has increased tremendously during my tenure as a judge. For example, in the last six
years, filings in the Second Circuit alone have increased from 1,801 in 1978, to 2,731 in
1983. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Court Management
Statistics 3 (1983). This surge has been accompanied by a dramatic increase in the com-
plexity of the cases themselves. Reliance on precedent, accordingly, is essential to effec-
tive judicial administration; but it is not enough. As Chief Judge of the Second Circuit, I
implemented a series of reforms to provide additional time for reflective decisionmaking
in important cases. This is critical to the maintenance of judicial excellence. The most
notable of these reforms is the Civil Appeals Management Plan. See Kaufman, The Pre-
Argument Conference: An Appellate Procedural Reform, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1094 (1974);
cf. Kaufman, The Federal Rules." The Human Equation Through Pretrial, 44 A.B.A. J.
1170 (1958) (urging flexible and informal pretrial conferences as a method of eliminating
calendar congestion).
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ward past authority. Moreover, many appeals present questions that are
only slightly different, if at all, from those that have come before, thus
occasioning little legal evolution.59
The challenges arise when the facts are not replicative from those in
cases past, when the precedents are pregnant with ambiguity or con-
flict,60 or when the case presents a combination of the two. No statutory
or common law rule points the way to an inevitable result. At such mo-
ments, the judge and the law become one, and when justice arrives-if it
is to arrive at all-it bears the indelible imprint of the values and beliefs
of that one individual. The attempt, then, to treat the law as a discrete
entity merges, as it must, with the wholly different question of the judge's
character. It is to this question that I now turn.
III. JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE: THE SILENT FORCES THAT GOVERN
DECISIONMAKING
The paths of judicial decisionmaking have long been the source of spir-
ited debate. The English scholar, Sir Carleton Allen, has written that
judges rely, in the end, on "reason, morality, and social utility" in decid-
ing cases of first impression.6" Cardozo described four adjudicatory
routes that a judge may choose in arriving at a decision: philosophy,
evolution, tradition and sociology.62 Cardozo did not intend that these
paths be discrete; he emphasized instead that more often than not, they
would flow together to form a wider stream capable of sustaining a
broader, farther-reaching legal principle.63 I will not reiterate the mean-
ing of each of these categories or surmise the relation they might have to
the determinative methods named by Sir Carleton. Instead, I shall at-
tempt to articulate what animates the judge to select one route rather
than another.'
To some extent, the path chosen is a function of the nature of the case
under consideration, for different questions require different approaches.
59. See B. Cardozo, supra note 1, at 164; see also Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244
U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (Judges legislate "only interstitially; they
are confined from molar to molecular motions.").
60. This is to be expected because the law of judicial precedent does not constitute a
logically cohesive and unified deductive system; it is at best an incomplete aggregate. See
Jones, Legal Inquiry and the Methods of Science, in Law and the Social Role of Science
123-24 (H. Jones ed. 1966).
61. C. Allen, Law in the Making 298 (1964).
62. Cardozo expounded on these decisionmaking routes as follows:
The directive force of a principle may be exerted along the line of logical pro-
gression; this I will call the rule of analogy or the method of philosophy; along
the line of historical development; this I will call the method of evolution; along
the line of customs of the community; this I will call the method of tradition;
along the lines of justice, morals and social welfare, the mores of the day; and
this I will call the method of sociology.
B. Cardozo, supra note 1, at 30-31.
63. Id. at 31.
64. See infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
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But ultimately, the choice reflects the personal bent of the individual
judge. When I think of any one of my esteemed colleagues on the Second
Circuit, for example, I cannot predict with certainty how he or she will
lean in a case allowing for judicial discretion. Nevertheless, certain domi-
nant traits do reveal themselves over time.65 One judge may appear at-
tracted to the law's need for broad conceptualizing,66 another to
precision, and yet another to the plight of an individual litigant. Were I
to enumerate the traits I deem most valuable in those men and women
who ply our trade, my terms might appear less lofty. For the personal
characteristics I most esteem are simply an intuitive sense of fairness, an
understanding of the real world and the capacity to continue learning.67
The relationship between the judge and the culture at large is a neces-
sary concomitant of these very personal forces that animate judicial deci-
sionmaking. Learned Hand spoke eloquently of the need for judges to
gauge the ethos of the community they serve. The profession of law, he
wrote, "must feel the circulation of the communal blood or it will wither
and drop off, a useless member."6
The difficulty of such a task cannot, however, be overstated. It is cer-
tainly true that there are as many conceptions of community and its
needs as there are judicial panels.69 The diversity of the community is
represented to some extent by the constituent members of the judiciary.
Although the reflection is not perfectly precise, the manifold conceptions
of Zeitgeist held by judges guard against the rise of aberrant perspectives.
Similarly, the constitutionally mandated independence of the judiciary
protects against the installation of a unitary conception of community on
the court.70
Moreover, even if an individual jurist were able to discern the pulse of
the times, it would be pure foolhardiness to think our pluralistic society
could move to a single beat. All societies will have conflicting ideals, of
course, at least as long as there is sufficient freedom to permit the expres-
sion of differences. Indeed, litigation is often a reflection of an outlet for
the struggle between such competing values.71 It is hardly likely that a
65. As Cardozo noted, "There is in each of us a stream of tendency ...... B. Car-
dozo, supra note 1, at 12.
66. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 477 (1897).
67. These traits have been referred to collectively under the rubric "common sense."
This label, however, embraces too much and conveys too little.
68. L. Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 15 (3d ed. 1960). Thus, a judge is "constantly
recasting and adapting existing forms, bringing to the high light of expression the dumb
impulses of the present." Id. at 16.
69. See Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 Yale LJ. 681, 711-13 (1979).
70. Id. Judicial independence is not a cliche conjured up by those who seek to prevent
encroachments by the other branches of government. The term is one of art, defined to
achieve the essential objective of the separation of powers: that justice be rendered with-
out fear or bias and that it be free from prejudice. See Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial
Independence, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 671, 687-94 (1980).
71. Alternatively, litigation has been described as "a critical breakdown of the
smooth-running, non-legal social regularities." J. Frank, supra note 3, at 336. This same
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judge could forge a consensus that society has not been able to achieve on
its own. Yet, at least in part, courts do serve that function. Whether
judicial pronouncements are perceived as oppressive commands or as just
solutions depends to a great extent on a judge's capacity to discern and
sound the common note of an era. Indeed, the law is a remarkably blunt
instrument if it is not supported by a social consensus that is consonant
with its important objectives.
How does a judge go about fulfilling this task? Part of the answer rests
in a judge's willingness to verse himself in the everyday events of the
society and their historical antecedents. A judge who can divine the
common element in a heterogeneous society is one who never forgets that
individual experiences must be viewed as part of a broader context.
Thus, the successful judge must refer to the contributions of the great
figures in philosophy, literature, history, psychology and other studies as
well as law. To conclude that a human being can take the measure of
other people's conflicting understandings of the law without enriching
his own experience with the insights of other minds is to reduce this great
profession to an isolated and sterile exercise.72
The difficult task of shaping the paths of the law must therefore be
informed by considerations of our culture's rich diversity and past. Yet in
the end, what the judge perceives as communal is merely a reflection of
the judge's own "values."
We live in a post-Freudian era, and our profession has been deeply
point has been made more recently by Derek Bok, President of Harvard University. See
N.Y. Times, June 1, 1983, at Al, col. 2. Yet, this idea is hardly one of recent vintage.
Indeed, Confucius believed that conflicts are disruptive of the natural peaceful order and
should be resolved by amicable compromise, thereby allowing nature to follow its harmo-
nious course. See Moser, Law and Social Change in a Chinese Community: A Case
Study From Rural Taiwan 61-63 (1982). The role of courts in the resolution of conflicts
has been viewed somewhat more charitably by Roscoe Pound:
[T]he law is an attempt to satisfy, to reconcile, to harmonize, to adjust these
overlapping and often conflicting claims and demands. . . so as to give effect to
the greatest total of interests or to the interests that weigh most in our civiliza-
tion, with the least sacrifice of the scheme of interests as a whole.
Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 39 (1943).
72. This exercise of ongoing education is essential when courts find themselves caught
up in the forces of history in the making. The Vietnam era is a salient example. The
court on which I sit heard many appeals concerning procedures for young men claiming
to be conscientious objectors. See, e.g., United States v. Chorush, 472 F.2d 917 (2d Cir.
1973); United States v. Aull, 469 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Holmes, 426
F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated, 402 U.S. 969 (1971); United States v. Bornemann, 424
F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Delfin, 419 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1969); Hammond
v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Gearey, 379 F.2d 915 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 959 (1967). A host of legal issues, including double jeopardy,
United States v. Velasquez, 490 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 946 (1975),
political questions, DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973), and freedom of
speech, Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
940 (1968), grew out of that war fought so far from this continent. I will discuss one set
of those cases briefly when I turn to the question of decisionmaking in cases interpreting
the Constitution. See infra notes 85-106 and accompanying text.
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touched by the lessons of legal realism. It can no longer be disputed that
we bring to our work what Cardozo called that "empire of [our] subcon-
scious loyalties."' 3 Indeed, Jerome Frank advocated that every judge un-
dergo what he referred to as "something like a psychoanalysis."' 4 The
judgment uninformed by self-examination is no better than the over-
informed opinion, with its insistence on maintaining certain personal be-
liefs about what is right or wrong in the world.
I have written elsewhere that the "personal element-that individual
sense of justice-is not only inextinguishable, but essential for the orderly
development of the law."' Thus, the question for judges is not whether
or not to detach. Rather, it becomes one of how much detachment will
permit us to take heed of the law while simultaneously recognizing the
human element implicated in the dispute. Our gravest error may be in
repressing our individual values in the hopes of achieving a pure legal
result.
Cardozo understood the temptation on the part of judges to disregard
their intuition because of the doubts generated thereby. If what is in fact
an ambiguous law can be read so as to provide an unequivocal result, a
judge can circumvent the tortuous process of balancing compelling and
conflicting equities. In discussing this choice of juridical approach, Car-
dozo wrote:
I was much troubled in spirit, in my first years upon the bench, to find
how trackless was the ocean on which I had embarked. I sought for
certainty. I was oppressed and disheartened when I found that the
quest for it was futile. I was trying to reach land, the solid land of
fixed and settled rules. ... As the years have gone by, and as I have
reflected more and more upon the nature of the judicial process, I have
become reconciled to the uncertainty, because I have grown to see it as
inevitable. I have grown to see that the process in its highest reaches is
not discovery, but creation.76
Despite Cardozo's seeming acceptance of uncertainty inherent in judi-
cial decisionmaking, his admission is expressed with a surfeit of discom-
fort. It is axiomatic that as conflicting precedents have appeared, and as
competing interests in society have multiplied, the task of the judge has
become increasingly burdensome. But this decisional anguish reflects the
dynamic nature of the judicial process. Certainty is a close affiliate of
stagnation. The difficulties attendant to appellate adjudication, there-
fore, confirm my belief that the law serves as a vibrant and capacious
vehicle for social advancement, capable of accomodating the variegated
demands posed by an ever more sophisticated society.
Further, although it was couched in elegant prose, Cardozo's point
was hardly novel. This was the very lesson preached by Holmes when he
73. B. Cardozo, supra note 1, at 174.
74. J. Frank, supra note 3, at 250.
75. Kaufman, supra note 69, at 714.
76. B. Cardozo, supra note 1, at 166.
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wrote that "certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of
man."77 The dangers posed by the inexorable search for certainty
prompted Jerome Frank to write: "We need a new kind of courage-the
courage to face unconquerable imperfections in the solution of human
problems."7" When the law provides us with decisional leeway, we do
well to recognize that our intuition, emotion and conscience are appro-
priate factors in the jurisprudential calculus. Our human qualities may
cause us to make mistakes; after all, judges are not infallible. But these
same human qualities may also prevent our making the worst error of all:
creating a schism between a formalistic legal order and commonly held
notions of social justice.
A judge's reliance on intuition is checked not only by precedent and
the need for consensus among the members of an appellate panel, but
also by the judge's own conscience. The society has given the honor of
making difficult legal choices to a select few. But that privilege, if I may
call it that, is two-sided. A judge, as Charles Clark once wrote, "is on his
own." 79 The litigant experiences the outcome of a case directly; the
judge, through his sense of responsibility, feels the results indirectly.
Each decision is inevitably and perpetually subjected to re-examination
by reference to the judge's internalized notions of justice.
The constraints imposed by a judge's individualized conscience are off-
set by the sweep of society's collective hopes and aspirations insofar as
they exert a liberating force upon him. The experience of judging must
never be cut off from the community's ideals. Our individual beliefs, for
whatever they are worth, are inextricably tied to our perceptions of the
common weal. The challenge for a judge is to ensure that those percep-
tions are not narrowed by ignorance. We need not and ought not detach
ourselves completely. Rather, we must continually enlarge the breadth
of our vision and study the world around us while we study the law.80
I have described two types of learning that I recommend to anyone
who sits on the bench: knowledge of the humanities and self-understand-
ing. There is, of course, another mode of education that is equally criti-
cal to a judge, and that is legal scholarship. The interplay between
precedent and scholarly writing is a fascinating subject that is deserving
of a lengthier examination than this forum provides. A law review article
or note may provide the impetus for a change in the law even when no
express authority exists in either precedent or the relevant legal rule. I do
77. Holmes, supra note 66, at 466.
78. J. Frank, supra note 3, at 425.
79. Clark, The Limits of Judicial Objectivity, 12 Am. U.L. Rev. 1, 12 (1963); see also
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947) ("Judges are supposed to be men of fortitude,
able to thrive in a hardy climate.")
80. See R. Pound, supra note 71, at 39; Kaufman, By and Large We Succeed, Time,
May 5, 1980, at 70; Proceedings of a Special Session to Commemorate Twenty-five Years
of Federal Judicial Service by the Honorable Irving R. Kaufman at 25-26 (Nov. 1, 1974)
(available in the files of the Fordham Law Review), reprinted in 508 F.2d 1, 25-26 (2d Cir.
1974) (tribute).
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not mean that scholarship provides us with a fortuitous citation when we
are desperate for support at the end of a shaky paragraph. At its best,
legal scholarship yields the collective thought of those who have mas-
tered the intricacies of a given body of law and have taken the time to
anticipate the prospective ramifications that might result from the sug-
gested change. Judges are thus reassured that other minds-relying on
much investigation of cases, legislative history and other scholarly
work-have also decided that the time is ripe to forge a new direction in
the law.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION: APPLICATION OF THE
ABSTRACT TO THE CONCRETE
No cases more fully implicate a judge's personal values than those in-
volving questions of constitutional dimension. Scholarly arguments con-
cerning neutral principles,"' fundamental rights"2 and the scope of
substantive or procedural due process8 3 assess the role of courts as one
component of our tripartite system of government. By implication, such
colloquy calls into question the extent to which courts ought to be in-
jected into the process of shaping societal values. For the moment, my
inquiry is a simpler one: Do courts approach decisionmaking differently
in constitutional cases? Because I need not render an opinion here, I
have the rare luxury of not being required to provide a definitive affirma-
tive or negative vote. My answer, then, is "Sometimes yes and some-
times no." I shall explain that response by reference to two examples.
A number of important constitutional cases were generated during the
Vietnam era. 4 One case concerned a teacher who was discharged for
wearing a black armband as a symbolic protest against the war. 5 The
potential for emotional response was apparent. Every American citizen
had his or her own view on the war in Vietnam; judges were no excep-
tion. Furthermore, the issue presented a stark conflict between two im-
portant societal concerns: individual freedom and the authority required
to preserve the democracy so crucial to realizing that freedom.8 6 This
case required another determination of the nature of individual freedom
guaranteed by the first amendment when balanced against the desire to
81. See J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 54-55 (1980); Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
82. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See generally J. Ely, supra note
81, at 43-72 (discussing various sources from which constitutional values can be gleaned).
83. See generally L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 501-63, 886-990 (describing
various viewpoints).
84. See supra note 72.
85. James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 571 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 409 U.S. 1042
(1972).
86. See generally Kaufman, The Child in Trouble: The Long and Difficult Road to
Reforming the Crazy-Quilt Juvenile Justice System, 60 Wash. U.L.Q. 743, 753-55 (1982)
(conflict between adolescents' individual freedom and the need for societal controls).
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provide the best for our children. 7
Judge Frank once said that all great jurists have viewed the Constitu-
tion as a masterpiece, for "the 'number of possibilities in which a work of
art may be interpreted convincingly is an indication of its greatness.' 8
The first amendment is a broad charter of freedom that courts must ap-
ply and refine in particular situations. The breadth of possibility, how-
ever, is greater than in ordinary adjudication, for the pull of stare decisis
is less strong when courts must return to the words of the great docu-
ment in an attempt to fathom their meaning as applied to a new contro-
versy. s9 At the same time the need to tread with care is great, for a
constitutional holding is weightier (and often harder to repair) than a
statutory or common law interpretation. 9°
Our impulse to express our own convictions, our personal beliefs, and
the values we imagine to have been in the minds of the framers is
checked, as it must be, by reality.9 I referred earlier to the importance
of the article III stricture concerning cases or controversies, 9 and herein
lies its majesty: I can go no further as a judge than the case itself per-
mits. 93 Nevertheless, the open-ended clauses in the Constitution invite
more far-reaching consideration of the implications of facts than do the
narrow words of statutes. 94
In the teacher protest case, one might have proceeded to explore the
abstract conflict between free expression and the need for education un-
disrupted by the political activism of the day. That approach, however,
would have ignored the factual setting that properly shaped our decision.
Our contextual inquiry revealed that there was no need to fashion a
broad principle, for the record revealed that "the Board of Education
. . . made no showing whatsoever at any stage of the proceedings that
[the teacher], by wearing a black armband, threatened to disrupt class-
87. See Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980) (student use of
public school for prayer meeting), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981); Thomas v. Board of
Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979) (school officials enjoined from punishing students
for publishing obscene tabloid off of school property), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980).
88. J. Frank, supra note 3, at 305, (quoting E. Krenek, a modern composer).
89. See B. Cardozo, supra note I, at 150; H. Friendly, supra note 21, at 164 (referring
to Justice Brandeis' dissent in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-06
(1932)).
90. See L. Hand, supra note 68, at 162.
91. See Stamicarbon, N.V. v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1974),
for a humorous example of reality impinging on a constitutional right: "James Madison
probably did not suppose, on suggesting to the House of Representatives its inclusion in
the Bill of Rights, that the right to a public trial would one day conflict with someone's
interest in concealing a method for producing a triamino derivative of symmetrical tria-
zine." Id. at 534.
92. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
93. It was this vision of the judiciary as a passive dispenser ofjustice on a case-by-case
basis that prompted Alexander Hamilton to note: "The judiciary ... may truly be said
to have neither force nor will, but merely judgment; . . ." The Federalist No. 78, at 428
(A. Hamilton) (G. Smith ed. 1901).
94. See B. Cardozo, supra note 1, at 71; L. Hand, supra note 68, at 159-61.
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room activities or created any disruption in the school.""' In short, there
was no evidence that required us to decide whether first amendment ex-
pression was destructive of other societal rights.96 Without questioning
the necessarily broad discretion of local school authorities in setting
classroom standards, we held that the teacher's discharge violated the
first amendment. Writing for the court, I reiterated words from an ear-
lier opinion on free expression in public educational institutions:
The best one can hope for [in cases involving the first amendment] is to
discern the lines of analysis and advance formulations sufficient to
bridge past decisions with new facts. One must be satisfied with such
present solutions and cannot expect a clear view of the terrain beyond
the periphery of the immediate case.
9 7
By contrast, the factual setting surrounding Herbert v. Lando,9 a case
addressing the scope of protection afforded by the first amendment to the
compelled disclosure of the editorial process, invited and indeed man-
dated the consideration of abstract constitutional principles relating to
freedom of expression. The adjudication of this dispute hinged upon a
delineation of the contours of the first amendment. Because such deci-
sions are by necessity as imprecise as they are significant, a judge must
include a panoply of elements in his or her jurisprudential calculus.
The case aptly illustrates the manner in which controversies implicat-
ing broad constitutional principles are adjudicated and the manifold
sources of authority that inform such decisions. The action stemmed
from allegations aired on the CBS program "60 Minutes" that a retired
Army officer, Anthony Herbert, had fabricated reports of war crimes in
Vietnam.9 9 Herbert sued the producer of the segment for libel. By the
time the appeal reached the Second Circuit, CBS had already provided
massive amounts of material in discovery relating to what producer
Barry Lando knew, saw, said and wrote during his research for the pro-
gram." Indeed, Lando had been deposed on twenty-six separate occa-
sions, and his testimony filled almost three thousand pages of
transcript.' Herbert, however, was not satisfied; he wished to discover
information regarding Lando's state of mind as he prepared the pro-
gram-the thoughts, opinions and conclusions he developed in the
course of his work.' 0 2
In my opinion for the court, I concluded that the compelled disclosure
of such personal matters would strike dangerously close to the "heart of
95. James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d at 572.
96. In addition, there was strong authority in one Supreme Court case for giving
weight to the absence of such significant facts. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Commu-
nity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
97. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 804 n.l (2d Cir. 1971).
98. 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
99. Id. at 982.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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the vital human component of the editorial process"' 103 and was not re-
quired by the first amendment."°4 This conclusion of constitutional di-
mension was derived by reference to a varied assortment of guideposts
rooted in history, logic, precedent and social welfare. In reaching it, I
was required to navigate the turbulent waters of first amendment
jurisprudence.
Freedom of thought, freedom of speech and freedom of the press are
valued in our society because they furnish vehicles for the new and the
provocative, and serve as barriers to tyranny. The debate on public is-
sues must therefore be robust and uninhibited.105 On occasion, the exer-
cise of liberties so precious as freedom of speech and of the press may do
harm that the state is powerless to recompense. Yet this is simply the
price that must be paid if we are to maintain a viable democracy.
This overarching principle is more than a personal predilection; it rep-
resents my assessment of the equipoise that exists among history, logic,
precedent and the societal will. The opinion articulated my efforts to
strike the appropriate balance.'
0 6
It is apparent, then, that cases interpreting the Constitution are differ-
ent, for they are more awesome, broader in their impact and more lasting
in their effect. Yet they are also the same as nonconstitutional cases in
that their resolution depends on the particular context in which they
arise. Facts work to limit the reach of judicial values, just as a judge
must remain cognizant of the judiciary's role in the greater political
scheme. I have come full circle, then, and have returned from law and
character to facts. My ideals as a judge are shaped by the restraints em-
bodied in article III. I might, therefore, call my jurisprudence an amal-
gam of external legal constraints and an internalized desire to respond to
the world in which we live.
CONCLUSION
I have discussed the importance of facts, the deference we are required
to pay statutes and precedents, and the internal-and often uncon-
scious-influences that are brought to bear in deciding appeals. I have
also expressed the view that abstract principles of judging are best under-
stood by reference to concrete situations. In concluding, then, I shall try
to illustrate my jurisprudential approach not with amorphous precepts,
but rather with the facts of one noteworthy case. 107
103. Id. at 984.
104. Id.
105. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
106. Questions of great constitutional import, such as the one described in the text, are
inevitably susceptible of myriad jurisprudential approaches. The Supreme Court applied
one different from my own, and reversed. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
107. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Kaufman, A
Legal Remedy for International Torture?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1980, § 6 (Magazine), at
44 (a discussion of the Second Circuit's condemnation of international torture).
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In the early spring of 1976, in the town of Asuncion in Paraguay, a
young woman, the daughter of a political dissident, was awakened by the
military police and taken to the home of Inspector-General Pena-Irala.
Inside, she was shown a brutally mutilated body, discolored and carved
by the marks of systematic torture. The body was that of her brother.
Two years later, when this young woman, Dolly Filartiga, was living
safely in Washington, D.C., she learned that Americo Norberto Pena-
Irala was being deported from the U.S. after having overstayed his visa.
Acting quickly, she arranged for service of a summons and complaint
upon him, alleging that he was responsible for the torture and death of
her brother. Thus, the story-the genesis of which lay in a small town in
Paraguay-found its way into our federal courts. Its life in the Eastern
District of New York was brief, however, for in May of 1979 the court
dismissed the complaint on jurisdictional grounds."' 8 The plaintiff
appealed.
The legal issue was whether Dolly Filartiga might invoke the jurisdic-
tion of the United States courts to sue a man accused of the brutal mur-
der of her brother outside this country." 9 The trial judge ruled that the
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, based upon his reading of two
Second Circuit cases that appeared to construe narrowly the phrase "law
of nations" in the Alien Tort Statute, a part of the Judiciary Act of
1789.11 The question on appeal, then, was whether the alleged torture
violated the "law of nations."
At the outset, my inclination was to announce that torture was cer-
tainly condemned by international law. As a judge, however, I was re-
quired to look beyond my own convictions. A Supreme Court case
supplied us with an enumeration of the sources of the law of nations.II'
Another Supreme Court precedent directed us to examine "customs and
usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, the works of jurists
and commentators."'12 Thus, in determining Dolly Filartiga's legal
rights, we relied on cases and scholarly works. From there, we found our
way to passages from the United Nations Charter and the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights. Finally, we turned to the documentation un-
derlying a variety of international treaties and accords. This examination
reinforced my original inclination that official torture is universally con-
demned both by law and by custom, and that this prohibition "admits of
no distinction between treatment of aliens and [of our own] citizens.'" 3
In authoring the unanimous decision of the court, I was thus able to
reject the trial court's narrow interpretation of the phrase "law of na-
108. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
109. See icL, 630 F.2d at 878.
110. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
111. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 159-60 (1820).
112. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
113. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 884.
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tions" that might have been read to preclude federal jurisdiction over
Dolly Filartiga's suit.
As Cardozo wrote, a judge "is not a knight-errant roaming at will in
pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his
inspiration from consecrated principles."" ' 4 The record, briefs and other
sources turned to in analyzing the issues presented by Filartiga demon-
strated that the court's intuitive response was not unique, but was widely
shared and reflected in scholarly writings and legal documents. Thus,
the controlling precedents, the views of the judges and the collective con-
science of civilized society coalesced to form the court's holding: "[T]he
right to be free from torture" is among those fundamental rights con-
ferred upon all people by international law." 5
The cases we confront may concern human stories in our public
schools, administrative agencies, the media, or any other sphere of social
action. They may turn on an interpretation of the Constitution or of our
contemporary laws. We may also face a legal dilemma generated by a
tragedy played out in distant lands, the resolution of which turns on a
statute almost two hundred years old. Whatever the genesis of the con-
troversy, it is always my hope that my ultimate consideration will be not
merely the avoidance of injustice, but what we might call the most just
result not only for our place and time, but also for what lies before us.
114. B. Cardozo, supra note 1, at 141. Moreover, this inspiration is not to be chan-
nelled randomly, but is to be applied rationally, guided by certain traditional and estab-
lished methods - what Pound referred to as "the received technique." See Pound,
Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, 7 Tul. L. Rev. 475, 481
(1933). The discovery of consecrated principles or the authoritative sources of legal order
coupled with the "received technique" make appellate judicial decisions "reckonable."
See K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 1-61 (1960).
115. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 885. Other issues were implicated in that
case, the most important of which concerned the constitutionality of § 9(b) of the Judici-
ary Act of 1789. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982). I need not elaborate here on the manner in
which that question was resolved, except to state that we did find it constitutional.
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